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Abstract
The problem of mitigating maliciously injected signals in interconnected systems
is dealt with in this paper. We consider the class of covert attacks, as they are
stealthy and cannot be detected by conventional means in centralized settings.
Distributed architectures can be leveraged for revealing such stealthy attacks by
exploiting communication and local model knowledge. We show how such detec-
tion schemes can be improved to estimate the action of an attacker and we propose
an accommodation scheme in order to mitigate or neutralize abnormal behavior
of a system under attack.
1 Introduction
Many systems of critical importance consist nowadays of tightly integrated physical and compu-
tational components, which may perform control and safety-critical tasks with high reliability re-
quirements. Additionally, such systems are often composed of several physically interconnected
subsystems that exchange information over a network for a number of reasons, ranging from data
analysis to design convenience, or simply because the physical system is itself geographically spread
over a large area. As a downside, however, these systems are potentially vulnerable to cyber-attacks
which may entail tangible consequences on the physical layer, if not disruption of the system it-
self. As observed recently Lee et al. (2016); Sobczak (2019), attacks constitute a realistic threat,
and being able to detect and counteract them to preserve some level of functionality is then of great
importance. In fact, this problem has attracted the interest of the control community over the last
decade; see for instance Cheng et al. (2017) and Dibaji et al. (2019) for recent surveys. However,
in the majority of cases, the centralized scenario is considered, with only a few works tackling the
issue from a distributed perspective Anguluri et al. (2019); Gallo et al. (2020).
Compared to other types of attacks, covert attacks are a class of particularly dangerous attacks,
which are undetectable by design in the centralized case Smith (2015). In Barboni et al. (2019),
it was shown that a specific residual generation scheme allows to detect such attacks, while they
remain stealthy within the attacked subsystem. The distributed detection strategy is inspired by
model-based fault detection (see Shames et al. (2011) and Boem et al. (2017) for instance), with
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Figure 1: Diagram of a single subsystem’s architecture. Details about the accommodation architec-
ture, with attack detection and accommodation measures.
a novel design that accounts for the stealthiness of the attacks (which is not an issue for faults in
general).
In this paper, we extend the detection architecture in Barboni et al. (2019) with the objective of
neutralizing (or at least mitigating) the attacker’s malicious effect on the system, that is to say we aim
to design a control law that steers the system as close as possible to the desired equilibrium regardless
of how the attacker manipulates the control actions (input injection). To the best of the authors’
knowledge, this is the first time that an active countermeasure methodology is proposed in the area
of control security, and even more in relation with distributed systems. However, accommodation of
faults has received considerable attention from the control community (see Zhang and Jiang (2008)
for a comprehensive review on the topic). One way to accomplish this relies on fault estimation in
order to cancel their unwanted effect on the system’s dynamics via a suitable change of the control
action Polycarpou and Vemuri (1995); Blanke et al. (2006). This is effective in case of actuator or
matching faults, and since input-injection attacks satisfy these same conditions, we gather from
this idea in order to compensate the attacks in an additive way. In dealing with this task from a
distributed perspective, a number of issues may arise in case of sparse interconnections between
subsystems. This fundamentally ties with the problem of (partial) input reconstruction Bejarano
(2011), as discussed later in the paper. Additionally, results are hereby presented in discrete time, as
opposed to the continuous-time case of Barboni et al. (2019).
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, the problem is formulated and the attack model is
presented; Section 3 provides a short recap of useful results and equations for the detection strategy;
in Section 4, the accommodation strategy is presented. Finally, in Section 5 an academic example is
given to show the effectiveness of the proposed distributed accommodation strategy.
1.1 Notation
For an ordered index set I, and a family of matrices {Mi ∈ Rn×m, i ∈ I}, coli∈I(Mi) denotes
the vertical concatenation of said matrices. For brevity, if x(k) is the value of a vector signal x at
time k, x+
.
= x(k + 1) denotes the value at the next time step. Similarly, x−
.
= x(k − 1) denotes
the value at the previous time step. For a vector v ∈ Rn, v[m] denotes its m-th component. For a
matrix M ∈ Rn×m, M † is its pseudo-inverse. Let R ⊂ X be vector spaces, then X /R denotes
the quotient space of X by R.
2 Problem Statement
We consider a linear time-invariant (LTI) system that can be partitioned into N subsystems, each
denoted as SSi, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For each subsystem, let Ni denote the index set of neighbors of
SSi. We model each subsystem as a discrete-time LTI system:
Si :


x+i = Aixi +Biu˜i +
∑
j∈Ni
Aijxj
yi = Cixi,
(1)
2
where xi ∈ Rni , u˜i ∈ Rmi , and yi ∈ Rpi are the local states, inputs, and outputs, respectively.
xj , j ∈ Ni are the neighbors’ states which enter the dynamics of SSi through the interconnection
matrix Aij ∈ Rni×nj .
Each subsystem is managed by a local unit LUi which contains a diagnoser implementing the pro-
posed attack-detection strategy and a given controller Ci. Additionally, these units are interconnected
along the same topology of the physical interconnections. As shown on the left-hand side of Fig. 1,
the attacker is represented by an interconnection block Ai, which injects signals ηi and γi in the
control and measurement channels, respectively, according to:
u˜i = ui + ηi,
y˜i = yi − γi.
Hence, LUi receives possibly attacked measurements y˜i, and yields a control action ui computed
accordingly; on the other hand, the plant SSi receives the counterfeit control action u˜i to which
corresponds an actual output response yi.
The attacker’s objective is to remain undetected while steering the system’s state to a trajectory
different from the nominal one, to its own advantage. A particular instance of attacks that are stealthy
by design are covert attacks, firstly introduced in Smith (2015) and investigated in the distributed
case in the time domain in Barboni et al. (2019).
Definition 1. The attacker Ai is covert if the outputs y˜i are indistinguishable from the nominal
response yi. ⊳
To perform a covert attack, the attacker implements a model S˜Si given by
S˜i :
{
x˜+i = A˜ix˜i + B˜iηi
γi = C˜ix˜i,
(2)
which is used to compute a “canceling” signal γi, for a prescribed input injection ηi. Let ka be the
attack onset instant and let the following assumption hold.
Assumption 1. The attacker has perfect knowledge of the subsystem model, i.e. (A˜i, B˜i, C˜i) =
(Ai, Bi, Ci). ⊳
It is shown in (Barboni et al., 2019, Proposition 1) that under Assumption 1, if x˜i(ka) = 0, the
attackerAi is covert at all times. Therefore, any residual generator exploiting only ui and y˜i cannot
be used for detection.
We point out that Assumption 1, while being difficult to achieve, represents the worst-case scenario
of an omniscient attacker who is perfectly stealthy. Such a condition frames the detection problem
as the most difficult, hence the derived results will also hold for easier cases.
For the scope of the present work, the problem is not limited to attack detection – which has been
already covered in the referenced works – but rather it focuses on the design of a control input ui
which attenuates the attack’s effects. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first time that
a solution to this problem in this distributed flavor is proposed. Due to the early stage nature of this
branch of research, we consider the ideal case in order to obtain basic conditions under which the
proposed strategy is effective, and ignore hereby other issues such as robustness to noise.
3 Detection Architecture
For sake of completeness, we recap the detection architecture presented1 in Barboni et al. (2019), as
well as some important results that are needed for presentation.
1Extended results including disturbances and detection bounds have been presented in a journal article
currently under review.
3
At a glance, the detection architecture comprises two observers – Odi and O
c
i – and an alarm mech-
anism that compares a specially constructed residual to a threshold. Observer Odi is decentral-
ized and computes an estimate xˆdi of xi insensitive to the neighboring states xj , j ∈ Ni; O
c
i in-
stead is distributed and accounts for the neighboring coupling by including communicated estimates
xˆdj , j ∈ Ni.
Let us define the estimation errors, where we distinguish between the actual errors and the received
(or attacked) ones as follows:
ǫdi
.
= xi − xˆ
d
i , ǫ˜
d
i
.
= xi − x˜i − xˆ
d
i ,
ǫci
.
= xi − xˆ
c
i , ǫ˜
c
i
.
= xi − x˜i − xˆ
c
i .
(3)
Note that the attacked errors are in fact those that a diagnoser can compute, as y˜i are the available
measurements. In fact, the actual errors are not available in any way, but they are still useful for
analysis and to quantify the attacker’s impact.
By construction, the signal r˜ci = Ciǫ˜
c
i is sensitive to attacks in neighboring systems. Suppose that
Subsystem i is under attack, the detection logic is as follows.
• Each LUj, j ∈ Ni computes r˜ci and compares it to a threshold r¯i. An alarm δj 6= 0 is
raised if ‖r˜ci ‖ > r¯i.
• δi is broadcast to each neighbor; conversely, SSi receives δj from all its neighbors.
• If δj 6= 0, ∀j ∈ Ni, then LUi decides that SSi is under attack.
Remark 1. In Barboni et al. (2019), the alarm variable δi was binary. In the present work, instead,
δi ∈ Rni , as it will take part into the attack accommodation algorithm, as shown in Section 4. ⊳
3.1 Decentralized Observer Od
The decentralized observer consists of a discrete-time Unknown Input Observer (UIO):
Od :
{
z+i = Fizi + TiBiui + (K
(1)
i +K
(2)
i )y˜i
xˆdi = zi +Hiy˜i.
(4)
If the existence conditions in Chen et al. (1996) hold, (4) is an UIO for subsystem (1). As such, the
error dynamics is described by:
ǫd+i = Fiǫ
d
i . (5)
Result 1 (Barboni et al. (2019)). Let Si be under attack, if the UIO conditions and Assumption 1
are satisfied, the following equations hold. The error dynamic of the observer (4) is
ǫd+i = Fiǫ
d
i + (Ai − Fi)x˜i +Biηi, (6)
while the attacked estimation error defined in (3) is given by
ǫ˜d+i = Fiǫ˜
d
i . (7)

A consequence of (7) is that the estimate does not converge to the actual state of the system, but
rather to the difference xi − x˜i, as can be seen from (3).
3.2 Distributed Observer Oc
The distributed observer Oci relies on decentralized estimates received over a communication net-
work, and its dynamics is defined as:
Oc : xˆc+i = Aixˆ
c
i +Biui + Li(y˜i − Cixˆ
c
i )
+
∑
j∈Ni
Aij xˆ
d
j .
(8)
Let F ci = Ai−LiCi, if both Fi and F
c
i are stable, then the estimate xˆ
c
i converges to the subsystem’s
state in attack-free conditions. In particular, the following result holds.
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Result 2 (Barboni et al. (2019)). Let Si be under attack, if Assumption 1 is satisfied. The error
dynamics of the observer (8) is
ǫc+i = (Ai − LiCi)ǫ
c
i +Biηi + Liγi +
∑
j∈Ni
Aijǫ
d
j ,
where ǫdj is given by (5), (6). Conversely, the attacked estimation error is given by
ǫ˜c+i = (Ai − LiCi)ǫ˜
c
i +
∑
j∈Ni
Aijǫ
d
j . (9)

Eq. (9) holds also when the system is not under attack. It can be seen that the received error (and
hence the residual) depends on the actual neighbors’ decentralized errors ǫdj . Since under attack ǫ
d
j
evolves according to (6), it follows that under reachability conditions of the pairs (F ci , Aij), for all
i ∈ Nj , the error ǫ˜ci does not converge to 0.
4 Attack Accommodation
This section is devoted to the design of a control action ui, which compensates for the effect of the
attacker in an attacked subsystem SSi. This strategy is triggered after the attack has been success-
fully detected and isolated. The accommodation strategy is based on the following observations:
• Since the estimation errors converge in nominal conditions, the error ǫ˜cj , j ∈ Ni can be
used to define
dj
.
=
∑
l∈Nj
Ajlǫ
d
l = ǫ˜
c+
j − F
c
j ǫ˜
c
j , (10)
which we have written in forward form for the sake of convenience. The variable dj repre-
sents the aggregate actual error of neighboring systems.
• From (3) we have that:
ǫdi = ǫ˜
d
i + x˜i.
Given that ǫ˜di converges to 0, the actual error ǫ
d
i depends directly on the state of the at-
tacker’s state x˜i, which can be seen as superimposed to the nominal system state x
n
i . In-
deed, with initial condition x˜i(ka) = 0, the dynamics of SSi can be decomposed as

(xni + x˜i)
+ = Ai(x
n
i + x˜i) +Biu˜i +
∑
j∈Ni
Aijxj ,
yi = Cix
n
i ,
γi = Cix˜i.
In view of these observations, the developed strategy aims at constructing an estimate of the at-
tacker’s state using neighboring errors. For this purpose, we redefine the alarm signal introduced in
Section 3 using (10) as:
δj =
{
d−j if ‖ǫ˜
c
j‖ > θj ,
0 otherwise,
for some suitable threshold θj . Suppose that SSi is under attack; if dj 6= 0, ∀j ∈ Ni, then the attack
is detected in the same way as previously presented.
A one-step lag estimate of ˆ˜x−i of x˜i can be obtained by solving the following Least Squares (LS)
problem:
ˆ˜x−i = argmin
ξ

 1Ni
∑
j∈Ni
‖δj −Ajiξ‖
2
2

 . (11)
The solution to (11) is given by:
ˆ˜x−i =

∑
j∈Ni
A⊤jiAji


−1
∑
j∈Ni
A⊤jiδj

 .
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Remark 2. With respect to just performing attack detection, the designed accommodation strategy
requires that the local diagnoser also knows the outbound interconnection matrices Aji. ⊳
Remark 3. Let δi
.
= colj∈Ni (δj) andAi
.
= colj∈Ni(Aji). Then problem (11) can be equivalently
reformulated in matrix form as:
ˆ˜x−i = argmin
ξ
‖δi −Aiξ‖
2
2 ,
for which standard solution techniques can be applied. ⊳
Uniqueness of the estimate depends on well-known rank conditions onAi, which we refer to as the
aggregate interconnection matrix. We defer discussion to the respective subsections.
To further develop our analysis, consider (1) and a control action of the form
ui = Ki(xˆ
d
i + ˆ˜x
−
i ) +
∑
j∈Ni
Kij xˆ
d
j − ηˆi. (12)
MatricesKij can be optimally chosen Sˇiljak (1978) to minimize the effects of neighbors on the local
dynamics. Without loss of generality, since our analysis focuses on attack compensation on SSi, we
can assume exact “cancellation” of neighboring states. Let ǫai
.
= x˜i − ˆ˜x
−
i and ǫ
η
i
.
= ηi− ηˆi, we have
that:
x+i = Aixi +BiKi(xˆ
d
i + ˆ˜x
−
i ) +Bi(ηi − ηˆi)
+
∑
j∈Ni
(Aij +BiKij)xj −
∑
j∈Ni
BiKijǫ
d
j
= Aixi +BiKi(xi − ǫ˜
d
i − x˜i + ˆ˜x
−
i ) +Biǫ
η
i
+
∑
j∈Ni
(Aij +BiKij)xj −
∑
j∈Ni
BiKijǫ
d
j
= (Ai +BiKi)xi +
∑
j∈Ni
(Aij +BiKij)xj +Biǫ
η
i
−BiKiǫ
a
i −BiKiǫ˜
d
i −
∑
j∈Ni
BiKijǫ
d
j .
(13)
In (13), Ki can be designed to achieve asymptotic closed-loop stability, and, with proper design
of the UIOs, the respective error terms are asymptotically vanishing. In this case, the attacked
subsystem is still driven not only by the attacker’s internal state, but also by the injected input
ηi. This entails the necessity of reconstructing such an input from the estimate ˆ˜x
−
i that has been
computed.
Remark 4. Although no assumptions are made on the controller, (12) is presented to simplify the
analysis in the case of linear control. In fact, the proposed accommodation strategy consists of an
additive input ηˆi and an additive estimate compensation ˆ˜xi, which can in principle be used in several
control designs. ⊳
4.1 Full-rank Aggregate Interconnection
If rankAi = ni, then the solution to (11) is unique, and we have that
ˆ˜x−i = x˜
−
i .
As a result, the error term ǫai obeys the dynamics
ǫa+i = A˜iǫ
a
i + B˜i∆ηi,
where ∆ηi = ηi − η
−
i . It is possible to obtain an estimate ηˆi which solves the input reconstruction
problem relative to the dynamics (2) for a known x˜−i .
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Definition 2 (Relative degree). Consider a linear system of the form (1). Let cl be the l-th row of
matrix Ci; if there exist integers rl such that
CiA
k
iBi = 0, CiA
rl−1
i Bi 6= 0, ∀k < rl − 1
and
rank


c1A
r1−1
i Bi
...
cpA
rpi−1
i Bi

 = mi
then r = [r1, . . . , rpi ] is called the relative degree of system (1). ⊳
Let us define the stacked vector of the attacker’s state and inject input estimates
ˆ˜xi
.
= col
t∈{1,...,r}
(ˆ˜xi(k − t)), ηˆi
.
= col
t∈{1,...,r}
(ηˆi(k − t− 1)),
respectively, and the input-to-state dynamic matrix Ψi Edelmayer et al. (2004):
Ψi
.
=


Bi 0 . . . 0
AiBi Bi . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
Ar−1i Bi A
r−2
i Bi . . . Bi

 ,
where r ≥ ni. Then, we can state the following.
Proposition 1. The injected signal ηi(k) can be estimated in finite time if and only if system (2) is
left-invertible. Furthermore,
ηˆi = Ψ
†
i
ˆ˜xi (14)
and
ηˆi(k) = ηi(k − r0 − 1) = ηˆi[r] (15)

Proof. If system (2) is left-invertible, then ˆ˜xi = Ψiηˆi admits a unique solution, given by (14). The
delay in the input estimate (15) follows by Definition 2, with ci taken as the canonical euclidean
basis vectors. In this, r0 is the largest component of the vector relative degree, i.e.
r0 = max
l∈{1,...,rpi}
(rl).
The additional lag step is given by the intrinsic delay in the estimate ˆ˜xi.
Remark 5. The left-invertibility condition necessary to obtain ηˆi is implied by existence conditions
for the UIO Odi Hou and Patton (1998), hence no further assumptions are made on the problem
setting. ⊳
In this case, from an analytical point of view, the compensation mismatch depends on differences of
the attacker’s input signal because of the intrinsic delay of the estimation procedure. For constant
injected inputs, e.g. steady offsets, it follows that attack compensation is exact.
Remark 6. Notice that rankAji = ni, ∀j ∈ Ni ⇒ rankAi = ni, but the converse is not true in
general. ⊳
4.2 Low-rank Aggregate Interconnection
In this subsection, we consider the case rankAi < ni. This is attained when a subset of the com-
ponents of xi does not influence the neighbors. More formally, the aggregate interconnection is
low-rank if ∃ gi ∈ N such that
dim

 ⋂
j∈Ni
kerAji

 = gi > 0.
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We can introduce a decomposition of the state space Rni into a non-interacting subspace X⊥i
.
=
kerAi and an interacting one X
||
i
.
= Rni/X⊥i . Clearly, we have that dimX
|| = ni − gi. Conse-
quently, we can define respective canonical projections ofRni onto these subspaces, and in particular
we consider Pi : R
ni → X
||
i .
With this projection, the solution of the LS problem will be exact only on the interacting subspace.
In particular, we have that
ˆ˜x
||−
i
.
= Pi ˆ˜x
−
i = Pix˜
−
i ,
ˆ˜x⊥−i
.
= (I − Pi)ˆ˜x
−
i = 0.
By means of this projection, it is possible to reframe the problem as the input reconstruction for the
system
S˜S
||
i :
{
x˜+i = A˜ix˜i + B˜iηi
x˜
||
i = Pix˜i,
(16)
where the second equation is considered as the system output. The input-output matrix can be
rewritten as
Ψ
||
i
.
=


PiA
r0−1
i Bi 0 . . . 0
PiA
r0
i Bi PiA
r0−1
i Bi . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
PiA
r−1
i Bi PiA
r−2
i Bi . . . PiA
r0−1
i Bi

 ,
where r ≥ ni and r0 = maxl∈{1,...,rpi}(rl) is the maximum relative degree of (16).
Definition 3 (Trentelman et al. (2012)). The constant λ ∈ C is an (A,C)-unobservable eigenvalue
if rank
[
λI −A
C
]
< n, with n = dimA. ⊳
Proposition 2. The input ηi(k) in (16) can be estimated in finite time if and only if the set of invariant
zeros of S˜S
||
i is identical to the set of (A˜i, Pi)-unobservable eigenvalues. Furthermore,
ηˆi =
(
Ψ
||
i
)†
ˆ˜x
||
i (17)
and
ηˆi(k) = ηi(k − r0 − 1) = ηˆi[r] (18)

Proof. Using (Bejarano et al., 2009, Theorem 4.10), we ensure that (16) is left invertible. In that
case, (17) admits a unique solution. The remaining considerations follow those in Proposition 1.
Finally, reusing ηˆi in (16) allows for a forward estimation of x˜
⊥
i . In fact, by definition, such part
of the state does not directly affect the neighboring dynamics and hence the communicated errors.
As a result, the only way of reconstructing the entire ˆ˜xi is via the state update equation of the local
attacker’s model (2).
Remark 7. The decomposition method presented in this subsection can be related to Bejarano
(2011), where however the problem statement is different. Despite the differences in the setting, in
the cited work, the input matrix (in the present case, the outbound interconnection) is decomposed
onto orthogonal subspaces, and partial left-invertibility conditions are developed for the decom-
posed system. ⊳
5 Simulation Example
We show the effectiveness of the proposed method on a simple numerical example on regulation.
This example is meant to illustrate the practicality of the proposed procedure.
8
Figure 2: State trajectories of SS3 (full rank interconnection).
The overall system comprisesN = 5 subsystems and the topology is described the following neigh-
bors sets: N1 = {2, 3},N2 = {1, 3, 4},N3 = {1, 2},N4 = {1, 2, 5},N5 = {4}. We consider the
full and low rank interconnection cases, and for both we use the following subsystem’s dynamics.
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}:
Ai =
[
0.4 0.2
0 0.3
]
Bi =
[
0
1
]
Ci = I Di = 0.
Choice of Aij will be presented in two separate examples in the following subsections. Individual
pairs of observers are designed for the two systems, as presented in Section 3. Each system im-
plements a control law of the form (12), which optimally decouples the neighboring dynamics and
achieves a prescribed rate of convergence.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, all subsystems implement the same dynamics and the
same interconnection. At time ka = 20, SS3 is covertly attacked according to the model presented
in Section 2. The attacker’s objective is to introduce a steady-state error into the regulator.
5.1 Full Rank Interconnections
For this case, the interconnection matrix is chosen as
Aij =
[
0.1 0
0 −0.01
]
.
Results for this example can be seen in Fig. 2 and 3. In the former, components of the true state
are shown, and it is possible to see that the effect of the attack is compensated according to the
controller’s dynamics with a certain delay. This delay is particularly evident in Fig. 3: in the left-
hand side figure, the one-step delay intrinsic in the computation of ˆ˜x3 is shown. This translates into
an r0 + 1 delay for the computation of ηˆ3, as depicted on the right-hand side of Fig. 2.
5.2 Low Rank Interconnections
In this case, the interconnection matrix is chosen as
Aij =
[
0.1 0
−0.1 0
]
.
As in the previous subsection, the results can be seen in Fig. 4 and 5. It can be noticed how the
performance of the accommodated system is not particularly different from that obtained in the full
9
Figure 3: (left) Attacker’s state trajectories and LS estimates; (right) Actual injected signal η3 and
reconstructed estimate ηˆ3 (full rank interconnection).
Figure 4: State trajectories of SS3 (low rank interconnection).
rank case. On the other hand, the estimation of the attacker’s state x˜3 is affected by a longer delay,
as shown in the left-hand side of Fig. 5. These estimates are obtained using the reconstructed input
as computed by (18), and which are shown in the right-hand side of the picture.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, a novel distributed methodology for accommodation of stealthy local attacks in in-
terconnected systems is presented. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first time a
step is done in this direction, and the approach can be in principle applied to other cases where lo-
cally unobservable states have no effects on residuals. Given the early stage nature of the presented
methodology, additional work is being done on characterizing robustness and the impact of noise
and disturbances on the estimates.
10
Figure 5: (left) Attacker’s state trajectories and LS estimates; (right) Actual injected signal η3 and
reconstructed estimate ηˆ3. Notice the longer delay needed due to the projection procedure (low rank
interconnection).
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